Revisionism

In his monograph ‘The Build-up of German Aggression’ Manfred Messerschmidt outlines the major factors behind failure of collective security and ‘the world which Versailles envisioned’. He argues that following the First World War and the conclusion of the major peace settlements it became increasingly clear that these major agreements had engendered a revisionist movement within Europe. This pervasive revisionism was embodied by a number of major powers across Europe who sought to relitigate territorial concessions they were forced to make at the conclusion of the First World War. The aggressive foreign policies which many of the revisionist regimes instituted ultimately contributed to the failure of collective security and in due course resulted in the Second World War.

On May 7th 1918, the final draft of the Treaty of Versailles was presented to the German diplomatic delegation. The territorial concessions coupled with the harsh disarmament demanded by the document planted the seeds for the emergence of German revisionism. In his monographic source ‘Republican and Fascist Italy’ John Hiden wrote “German resentment against the Versailles terms… was certainly a factory aiding Hitler’s power”. Some have argued that Hiden’s perspective is only indicative of elite within Germany however the territorial concessions outlined by the treaty were viewed with particular disdain among pan-Germanists many of whom, like Hitler were in political and diplomatic positions. Sudetenland, for instance, was home to 3 million ethnic Germans. Pan - Germanists who dominated Germany’s diplomatic core believed that these individuals had an intrinsic right to ethnic self determination as outlined by Wilson’s 14 points. Germany’s desire to reunite these 3 million Germans with their homeland was illustrated on September 30th 1938 when Hitler made a multilateral agreement to reincorporate Sudetenland into the third reich. Moreover, the creation of the Polish corridor prompted a vitriolic reaction from the Germans. In a letter to the heir to the German throne German Foreign Secretary, Gustav Stresemann, wrote “The third great task is the readjustment of our Eastern frontiers: the recovery of Danzig, the Polish frontier, and a correction of the frontier of Upper Silesia.” This revisionist sentiment was ultimately warped into Hitler’s notion of ‘Lebensraum’ which prompted him to invade Poland on September 1, 1939. Germany’s aggressive quest to revise territorial concessions made during the peace settlements contributed heavily to the gradual erosion of relations with the allied powers. Some historians like Gabriel Kolko have argued that the Locarno treaties of 1925 represented progress in the way of weakening the revisionist movement. However, many have refuted Kolko, claiming that by assuring Germany of peace in the west, and by not placing its eastern frontiers with Poland under international guarantee, Locarno left open the eventual possibility of revision of the German - Polish frontier. Lastly, the Versaille Treaty’s injunction of the possibility of a German Anschluss with Austria further galvanized resentment from Germany. When Germany ultimately annexed Austria in 1938 the allied powers were forced to remain passive. Additionally, the harsh reparations payments demanded by the British and French became a major point of contention amongst German revisionists. More moderate revisionists like Stresemann sought to restructure these payments diplomatically through agreements like the Dawes Plan (1924) and The Young Plan (1929). However, more radical revisionists including the NSDAP sought complete cancellation of these payments and regarded the agreement to the plans an act of high treason demanding a referendum in response. Ultimately Germany’s shift to revisionism served to carry out the erosion of Versailles’ new world order. It prompted the German government to pursue a more aggressive military (Polish Corridor, and Austria) and diplomatic (Sudetenland, reparations) policy which led to the erosion of relations and the failure of collective security.

In addition to Germany, Italy’s shift to becoming a revisionist power was largely induced by the peace settlements. Historian A.J.P Taylor argues that Mussolini’s rise to power and Italy’s ideological similarity to Germany was largely prompted by the peace settlements. Mussolini’s predecessor Vittorio Orlando entered the peace settlements desperate to demonstrate to the Italian electorate that Italy was not a ‘proletarian nation’ subservient to the Great Powers. Following his inability to secure Italy’s right to annex the port of Fiume, Orlando was forced to resign on June 23rd 1919. The Italian electorate regarded this failure as a ‘mutilated victory’ and in the coming 1934 election chose to resort to a more aggressive revisionist: Benito Mussolini. Mussolini’s election came as a major blow to collective security and the Versailles system of peace treaties. His fascist ideology provided a framework for the emergence of more alt-right governments across Europe, including Hitler. Hitler’s ideological similarity with Mussolini would make them de facto allies with a common goal to destroy the Versailles system of peace treaties. Mussolini’s disdain for collective security was illustrated in October of 1935 the Italian invasion of Abyssinia. Mussolini’s aggressive military policy in conjunction with his imperialist ambitions provided a stark upheaval to the new world order ushered in by Versailles.

German and Italian revisionism led to the progressive degradation of collective security and global diplomatic relations. As their revisionist policy was generated by a failure of the Versailles treaty system many historians to this day argue the peace settlements were a major cause for the Second World War. Additionally, the bureaucratic mechanisms which underpinned the Versailles Treaty system also forced the Great Powers to pursue appeasement as the enforcement of the treaty was fundamentally unrealistic.